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GENERAL COMMENTS 
 
This consultation is to be welcomed. School governors have oversight over the effective 
use of a substantial value of public funds provided by the taxpayer and it is important that 
the framework within which they operate is such as to ensure the most effective use of 
these public funds in achieving the educational goals for which they have been allocated. 
This is particularly significant if related goals of achieving a “knowledge economy” are 
to be realised (see, for example, the Department of Trade and Industry White Paper “Our 
Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy”, 1998). Some of the 
solutions contained in the Consultation Paper are imaginative and are likely to command 
widespread support; however, the conceptual foundations of the document lack 
coherence. This response to the Consultation Paper is based on the assumption that the 
principles which are being developed throughout the corporate “for profit” and “not-for-
profit” sectors in relation to institutional governance provide a valuable framework with 
which to evaluate the governance of schools. It commences in this section with general 
comments on the theoretical basis of the Consultation Paper. In the second section it 
comments in detail on the specific questions posed by the Consultation Paper. The third 
section contains an alternative scheme of proposals. 
 
The Consultation Paper is to be commended for explaining the theoretical basis for the 
proposals. In particular, paragraph 18 puts the case in the following terms: 
 
“Governing bodies are built up of stakeholders. They bring together parents, school staff, 
Local Authority and sometimes church representatives, as well as representatives from 
business and the wider community. Although other models would be possible, we have 
no wish to change this ‘stakeholder model’, which is built on well-established principles 
of democratic accountability, and offers real potential for developing schools as centres 
of wider community involvement.” 
 
We would question this model in the strongest terms. 
 
Stakeholder theory is only one of a number of models commonly applied in management 
literature: prominent others are agency theory and stewardship theory. The origins of 
stakeholder theory should not inspire confidence in it as a basis for school governance: 
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the term originated in the US as a pun on the US equivalent term for “shareholder”, i.e. 
the “stockholder”. It developed largely away from the public eye as a tool of management 
analysis, where it has performed a broadly useful role as an analytical tool. 
Unquestionably, it is desirable for organisations of all kinds to be able to analyse whom 
their stakeholders are and how well they are being served by the organisation. In this 
sense it provides a form of accountability. However, many have attempted to extend the 
use of stakeholder analysis into what might loosely be termed stakeholder accountability. 
In this sense, those with management responsibility within an organisation are to be made 
legally accountable to stakeholder interests, either in an endogenous fashion, say by the 
inclusion of stakeholder representatives in governance, or in an exogenous fashion, say 
by requiring the organisation to act in the public interest. Whilst laudable and well-meant 
such arguments are based on fundamental misapprehensions as to the fundamentals of 
governance and are inherently dangerous. 
 
The detailed arguments as to the desirability of a stakeholder model – there termed a 
“pluralist model” - have in fact been recently considered by the Department of Trade and 
Industry under the auspices of the Company Law Review Steering Group and, in effect, 
soundly rejected. In our view, this rejection was correct. The stakeholder model of 
governance does not, and cannot, produce any form of true democratic accountability. By 
attempting to ensure that, in effect, all interested parties are accountable to all interested 
parties, the end result is that no-one is accountable to anyone. There is certainly anecdotal 
evidence from parents to conclude that this is their impression of the present system. 
Fortunately, many – indeed perhaps most – schools are no doubt well governed and 
conceptual issues of accountability are therefore of only theoretical interest in such cases. 
However, the robustness of the system should instead be evaluated by reference to those 
situations where schools are in difficulties. The experience of parents in such a situation 
is that they are for practical purposes outside of the loop. The head and board of 
governors of such a school may well be unable to recognise the problem, constitute the 
problem or fail to have the skills to deal with the problem or some combination of these. 
The local education authority will have little incentive, or lack adequate legal powers, to 
intervene. The DfEE may regard such a matter as a local matter (albeit that in a sense all 
schools are a local issue). Ofsted is unlikely to become involved other than if a problem 
becomes apparent on a visit and then it is possible that some time will elapse between a 
school being given the benefit of the doubt through to there being a sequence of failures. 
Parents might reasonably conclude that real accountability lies either with the courts or 
with the media, neither of which is satisfactory. The “stakeholder model” is likely to fail 
in precisely those situations where a robust model is most required. 
 
We believe that the most effective model to apply to the governance of schools is the 
classical economic model for the achievement of allocative efficiency. This economic 
model and its underlying assumptions have been set out elsewhere by members of the 
European Centre for Corporate Governance (see for example, Maughan, C.W. and Copp, 
S.F. “The Law Commission and Economic Methodology: Values, Efficiency and 
Directors’ Duties” (1999) 20 The Company Lawyer 109 and “Company Law Reform and 
Economic Methodology Revisited” (2000) 21 The Company Lawyer 14). The following 
economic methods of analysis are applicable here. Firstly, we assume that the relevant 
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actors, whether heads, governors or regulators are rational actors. Second, we see the 
governance system of a school as a typical example of a principal/ agency relationship 
giving rise to moral hazard and opportunism. Third, we see the role of the regulatory 
authorities, namely the local education authorities and the relevant organs of the DfEE 
through the lens of public choice theory as typical bureaucracies, leading to allocative 
inefficiency.  
 
Let us commence by explaining further our view on the relevant actors as being rational 
actors. For economic purposes it is assumed that when individuals make choices this is 
done rationally, in other words, to improve their personal well-being, in other words their 
“utility”, “welfare” or “wealth”. In terms of school governance the question posed then is 
what are these various actors maximising (to paraphrase the title of a paper by the US 
writer Richard Posner in “Overcoming Law” (Harvard University Press, 1995) called 
“What do Judges Maximise?”)? Let us consider the position of a school governor. Many 
no doubt are motivated by a sense of altruism. However, given the onerous nature of the 
office of a governor one must treat with scepticism claims to altruism. There are many 
other possible motivations for becoming a governor which perhaps are more consistent 
with the assumptions of the economic model. High on the list of potential sources of 
motivation might be a desire to further the governor’s own children’s interests or those of 
their close associates. For others it might be to gain a sense of status and authority denied 
them in their occupation. For some it might be seen as a way to further their business 
interests by providing possible business. However, as governors are progressively given a 
greater role there are other possibilities which should be of concern. There might be 
opportunities for fraud. Special interest groups, whether based on political affiliation, 
religious belief or sexual orientation, may see this as a route to promote their wares. 
Whilst it might be hoped that such motivations might be rare it is important to ensure that 
the governance system is robust enough to withstand this. The purpose of a good 
governance system is not to assume good motivation but to protect against base 
motivation. 
 
The principal/ agency problem that has been identified applies in essence where an 
individual/ group becomes responsible for “other people’s money”, to be more precise 
where one party, the “principal”, delegates some decision-making authority to another, 
the “agent”. In such situations the law normally imposes some fiduciary obligation on the 
agent to ensure that the agent acts in accordance with the interests of the principal. 
However, the position is more complex under the present “stakeholder model” applied in 
school governance. It has been well argued by Anthony Ogus that: 
 
“In a public, institutional setting, agent accountability poses greater challenges. In the 
first place, there is not a single, homogenous group of principals concerned to monitor the 
performance of regulators, but rather a diverse set of interests, including politicians and 
citizens. Secondly, performance is, in any event, more difficult to monitor, there being no 
conventional, profit and loss accounts. Thirdly, except for the limited experiments with 
competitive self-regulation … there is no market for the control of regulators; and the 
principals (politicians and citizens) cannot easily dismiss ineffectual officials.”  
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(“Regulation, Legal Form and Economic Theory”, Oxford University Press: 1994 at page 
112) 
 
The classic way to seek to resolve the principal/ agency problem is to seek to align the 
interests of the principals and agents. This however presupposes that it is possible to 
identify with any precision who the principals and agents are, what their respective 
interests are and whether these are in common or in conflict. It is exactly these questions 
which are difficult to answer with a stakeholder model: in other words who is 
accountable to whom, for what, and what happens if they fail? We see the strongest 
solution to the principal/ agency problem as having evolved in the corporate context. 
Directors are accountable to shareholders: the shareholders have the power, subject to 
very few conditions, to call a meeting and sack the board of directors. Consumers in 
competitive markets may take their custom elsewhere. Both shareholders and consumers 
are protected by copious legislation evolved over some time. These basic mechanisms for 
accountability are non-existent to weak for many parents. From a parental perspective, 
there is no ability to call a meeting and sack an ineffective board of governors or head. 
There are weak competitive markets: in effect many schools possess a local monopoly 
(and indeed some demonstrate the characteristics of a monopolist). In this latter regard 
the limit imposed by law on class sizes has played a significant part and is believed to be 
under challenge as a matter of human rights’ law in the High Court, London, at the 
present time. 
 
Critical to the problem of accountability is the way in which governing bodies are now 
incorporated, i.e. each governing body has its own separate legal existence. The members 
of the governing body have no personal financial liability for any of its actions, broadly, 
provided that it acts within the law and in good faith, i.e. consistently and after 
considering any necessary advice. In our view, this approach to incorporation is 
hopelessly confused. The governors of a school may be equated with the shareholders in 
a company registered under the Companies Act 1985 by virtue of their status as members 
of an incorporated body. Yet shareholders will usually have a clear financial interest in 
their company’s success: governors in a school have no such clear interest. The 
shareholders in a company hold the directors accountable for their stewardship of the 
company. In school corporations it seems that the governors are in effect holding 
themselves accountable. This confusion is reflected in the procedures to remove a 
governor which in general terms depend on the particular type of governor. A clearer 
model would regard the parents as members who would hold the board of governors 
accountable as if the board of directors in a company. Other constituencies might also be 
represented, such as church interests in appropriate cases, but not local education 
authorities since as we will proceed to demonstrate, local education authorities should be 
dispensed with.  
 
The way in which we understand the regulatory system is derived from public choice 
theory. It may be contrasted to the public interest theory of regulation which attributes to 
legislators and others a desire to pursue collective goals. The private interest theory of 
regulation takes the view that political and law-making processes can be used by private 
interest groups to secure regulatory benefits. In return, regulatory failure may result from 
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the capture of the regulatory body by private interests. Such an approach leads to a re-
evaluation of other agencies, such as local education authorities, which are presumed to 
act in the public interest. These may be seen as a bureaucracy where bureaucrats are 
themselves simple utility maximisers. As with governors of schools, the question must be 
asked as to what local education authority bureaucrats maximise? Following the classic 
arguments of Niskanen (see Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, Institute of Economic 
Affairs, London 1973), it would be expected that such bureaucrats would seek to 
maximise their salary, the size of staff working for them and their salaries, their public 
reputation, their perks and their power and status. If this theory is correct, then it would 
seem that local education authority bureaucrats will be ineffective because they will have 
inappropriate incentives. In particular, the need to maintain a public reputation will give 
rise to a conflict of interest over any function where transparency would be desirable. 
Similar factors apply to the exercise of any regulatory function by the DfEE. However, 
the problem is most acute in the case of local education authorities because in practice 
democratic controls over local authorities are weak because of voter apathy. 
 
We believe that the most effective system of accountability in school governance is one 
which is based upon the transfer of significant powers to parents. In a corporate context, 
Vanessa Finch has demonstrated (“Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and 
Care?” [1992] Modern Law Review 179) how it is only shareholders who can be 
effective monitors of corporate management. Similarly, in a school context it will usually 
be parents who care most about their childrens’ education rather than those with a 
professional interest, and governance structures should reflect this. We will set out at the 
end of this Response our specific proposals for how this might be achieved. 
 
SPECIFIC COMMENTS 
 
1. We believe a more radical solution is required as set out generally in this 
Response. The respective roles of the board of governors and the head should be 
for the board of governors to determine in accordance with a constitution which, 
in our view, should be approved by the parents. 
 
2. See response to question 1. 
 
3. See response to question 1. 
 
4. See response to question 1. 
 
5. We believe in a more radical solution, including the abolition of local education 
authorities and improving competition in educational provision. Under such an 
approach schools would have more authority over such issues. 
 
6. See response to question 5. 
 
7. We believe that if new duties are imposed then appropriate incentives/ sanctions 
must be incorporated in the legislation to ensure compliance as otherwise the 
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duties will be little more than aspirations, a criticism already made over duties 
imposed in recent legislation requiring, for example, policies on bullying to be 
produced by schools. Such legislation brings the legislative process itself into 
disrepute. 
 
8. We agree with the proposal that there should be “gate-keeping” to prevent 
governing bodies becoming overloaded. We would also agree with the proposal to 
empower governing bodies to provide child-care. 
 
9. We believe that more radical solutions are required as set out generally in this 
Response. 
 
10. We do not agree that grouped governing bodies should be possible. A more 
effective solution to the problem of weak governing bodies would be, for the 
reasons set out in the general section above, for there to be paid professional 
bodies of governors who are subject to parental control by parents being 
empowered to call a parents’ meeting and dismiss a weak governing body. The 
problem with grouped governing bodies is that it would be more difficult as a 
consequence to introduce this more effective approach to accountability. Indeed, 
it might well be argued that if a school is for whatever reason incapable of 
possessing an effective governing body then it would be better closed. 
 
11. No. We believe this power should be located in parents. It would have been 
interesting had the Consultation Paper contained statistical evidence as to the 
present exercise of the powers held by the Secretary of State, including how many 
times there had been requests made for the existing powers to be exercised, how 
many times it had been so exercised and on what grounds the power had been 
exercised or refused to be exercised. Following the public choice/ bureaucratic 
models applied in the general section above, we would as a matter of concept see 
no reason to extend the powers to local education authorities but rather to strip the 
DfEE of these powers and transfer them to an independent body charged with 
representing parental interests, in effect, an “Educational Ombudsman”, a role 
which might indeed be capable of combination with the present jurisdiction of 
Ofsted which has developed a robust reputation. The principles that should 
underpin its jurisdiction are: (1) a transparent, independent and full analysis of 
why the school has failed is essential for an appropriate solution to be devised; (2) 
remedial action is usually required swiftly: the interests of parents and their 
children are more important than those of regulators, school employees or others; 
(3) removal of the head and/ or all/ some of the board of governors is usually 
required;  
 
12. We believe the “special measures” restriction to be too strict and liable to result in 
excessive delays in exercising any powers, during which pupils may be adversely 
affected. See further the response to question 11. 
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13. Yes, as explained in the general section above provided they satisfy the tests of 
competence and independence. Payments to parent governors would be 
inappropriate. 
 
14. We believe that the present dependence on amateur governors would require such 
training. It would be preferable in our view if there was a fully professional paid 
body. 
 
15. None. 
 
16. We believe that caution should be exercised with these proposals. For example, 
we would believe it inappropriate for there to be an honorarium in the absence of 
proposals for greater governor competence, independence and accountability. 
 
17. We agree. However, we believe that this should be the natural function of the 
creation of an effective board in line with usual corporate governance principles. 
 
18. We believe that local education authorities should be abolished. 
 
19. See response to question 18. 
 
20. We agree as this would facilitate the recruitment of a professional body of 
governors. 
 
PROPOSALS 
 
We commenced this Response under the title “Parent-centred Governance”. In the course 
of this Response we have sought to outline what the true theoretical basis for school 
governance should be and have indicated where appropriate alternative approaches to 
those set out in the Consultation Paper. We believe that these alternative approaches 
result in a more coherent set of proposals for reform. They can be summarised as follows: 
 
• The role of local education authorities and the related role of the DfEE in 
relation to school education and, in particular, governance should be removed 
enabling substantial cost savings. 
• These cost savings should be used to enable the creation of a professional and 
paid body of school governors whose recruitment would follow a similar 
pattern to that for company directors in listed companies who perform a 
similar gubernatorial role. The professionalism of this body would be secured 
by the establishment and /or recognition of a professional body to possess 
self-regulatory functions as to education, standard setting and discipline. 
• Governors should be competent and independent if they are to be effective. 
Competence should be secured by requiring minimum standards of 
qualification and/ or experience, usually in a professional or managerial 
capacity. Independence should be secured by strengthening the legal rules to 
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deal with conflicts of interest and ceasing the practice of appointing parent 
governors. 
• Schools should be required to disclose details of governors and their 
qualifications and experience to parents and potential parents since, given 
their pivotal role in school governance, this is a vital aspect of ensuring 
competition between schools through informed choice.  
• Boards of governors should be fully accountable to parents. In a thoroughly 
revised corporate model of school governance, parents should be given rights 
more comparable to those of shareholders in a company. The role of the 
Annual Parents’ Meeting and Annual Report should be significantly enhanced 
and new powers conferred upon parents to call an Extraordinary Parents’ 
Meeting where circumstances require this. In either event, parents should have 
a range of powers conferred to give their role “teeth.” 
• An Education Ombudsman should be appointed under the auspices of Ofsted 
to represent parental interests and conduct an investigation into a school, 
where specified grounds are satisfied, including but not limited to numerical 
strength. The Education Ombudsman would owe a duty to parents in law for 
the discharge of its functions enforceable through the courts. The Education 
Ombudsman would be given a wide range of powers to enable its functions to 
be discharged effectively, including the power to make interim awards. 
• The present cap on class numbers in schools should be removed so as to 
permit competitive forces to work in relation to schools. 
 
